

# Authoritarian Infiltration of Organizations: Causes and Consequences

Monika Nalepa and Grigore Pop-Eleches  
(University of Chicago) (Princeton University)

**Abstract** Covert forms of authoritarian control remain an understudied strategy of authoritarian survival. This article uses the infiltration of the Catholic Church with secret collaborators in communist Poland to study the drivers and consequences of such covert forms of control. We theorize that sub-national variation in communist infiltration is driven by differences in organizational vulnerability following WWII. In turn, we argue that the uneven degree of infiltration with pro-regime agents shaped the subsequent effectiveness of the Church to foster anti-communist attitudes. We test these predictions against competing explanations (including imperial legacies and modernization) by analyzing seven Polish surveys from the late communist period (1985-89). Our results confirm the importance of organizational vulnerability in driving the success of communist infiltration efforts and suggest that infiltration with secret agents was effective in undermining the Church's ability to shape the political attitudes of frequent churchgoers.

## ***1. Introduction***

Authoritarian control takes a variety of forms. On one end of the spectrum, is violent repression of opponents and uncommitted bystanders (Svolik 2013, Geddes et.al 2014);<sup>1</sup> on the other end of the spectrum, are more subtle though technologically advanced forms of control such as surveillance (Greitens 2016, Scharpf and Gläbel 2019) and propaganda (Little 2017, Peisakhin and Rozenas 2016, Enkolopov et.al.2011).<sup>2</sup>

Engaging in these more subtle techniques, when effective, allows autocrats to save on the costs of violent repression. Their deployment may, but need not be, secretive. Some veteran authoritarian states, such as Syria and many of the former communist states in the Soviet bloc conducted and disseminated their propaganda quite openly and remained effective even when its manipulative character was commonly known.<sup>3</sup>

Likewise, surveillance and censorship can be a completely open state policy, which discourages potential resistance to the state. Yet these more subtle techniques of control are most effective when they are implemented and conducted without the knowledge of those who are targeted. Consequently, authoritarian persuasion is most effective when it occurs under the

---

<sup>1</sup> Although direct violence meted out by uniformed authoritarian forces silences opposition, it does not eradicate it. Opposition to the regime, though stifled, may easily resurface once the repressive constraints weaken (Bautista et. al. 2019, Peisakhin 2014, Lupu and Peisakhin 2015, Rozenas et. al. 2015, Mattingly 2020).

<sup>2</sup> Greitens (2016) discusses the tradeoffs of engaging in covert rather than overt forms of authoritarian control. Investing in a secret police apparatus that infiltrates civil society, provides the regime with more robust sources of information and requires less violence than ruling with the help of uniformed enforcement agencies. It is associated, however, with a risk: a centralized agency concentrating information may eventually present a challenge to the autocrat himself.

<sup>3</sup> Wedeen (2015) describes citizens subjected to propaganda who at the individual level are perfectly aware that they are being manipulated and yet participate in its “spectacle” to the point that it becomes an effective instrument of control.

disguise of objective information; the best way to turn members of an independent organization into supporters of an authoritarian state is to infiltrate that organization with leaders who will disseminate propaganda in ways that are completely covert. Those who are being manipulated are completely unaware of the manipulation.

To deliver such propaganda in ways that are not detectable to those who are subjected to it, regimes need to *infiltrate* non-state organizations (such as religious groups, trade unions or opposition movements). Since the infiltrators' true loyalties are kept secret from the organizations' members, the infiltrators can influence members' hearts and minds while the latter do not even know they are being manipulated.

This paper is devoted to *infiltration as covert persuasion*. More generally, we infiltration can be defined as any penetration of potentially opposition organizations by pro-regime agents. Infiltrators of a trade union can alert the authoritarian regime about upcoming strike activity that could evolve into a more general anti-regime protest. Infiltration of a church organization can give the agents of the authoritarian regime access to private details of citizens' lives, which can then be used against those citizens.<sup>4</sup> Hence, infiltration can be used for the purposes of information gathering. Infiltration can also be used to affect the functioning of the organization itself. After infiltrating an organization, agents of the regime can sabotage the strength and unity of the organization, and thereby undermine its ability to promote resistance against the regime. This latter kind of infiltration is very close in character to the cooptation of

---

<sup>4</sup> In Catholic countries, collaborating priests had informed the secret police about sexual transgressions of parishioners shared with the priest in Confession, a monthly ritual performed by observant Catholics (Nalepa 2010).

members of the opposition into authoritarian institutions, a phenomenon that has received much scholarly attention in political science (Gandhi 2008, Magaloni 2006).<sup>5</sup>

In contrast to these other uses, infiltration as *covert* persuasion first penetrates an opposition organization with regime sympathizers and then uses these sympathizers to turn the organization – originally, a potential source of opposition – into an ally and mouthpiece for the regime. Strictly speaking, the infiltration itself is not the form of authoritarian control, but rather the strategy that enables it to take place. The identity of infiltrators at the time of penetration is unknown, which allows them to influence other members more effectively than if their true identity had been disclosed. If the regime’s sympathizers remain undetected inside the organization they have penetrated, they may influence attitudes even in the absence of specific propaganda directives from the regime, simply by taking up space that could have been occupied by someone less sympathetic to the regime. As a result of this infiltration “afterlife,” the effects of penetrating an opposition organization can be long-lasting.

This study uses the case of Poland’s infiltration of the Catholic Church with communist sympathizers in the early 1950s to document and analyze the causes and consequences of infiltration as covert persuasion. Leveraging subnational variation in the extent of this infiltration, we show that the regime’s ability to penetrate organizations, and thereby use them as part of their strategy of authoritarian control, hinges on the vulnerability of non-state organizations. Such vulnerability may be driven by external factors, such as social upheaval in the aftermath of traumatic events, or by internal organizational dynamics, such as leadership choices and turnover. Regardless of its source, it creates openings that authoritarian governments

---

<sup>5</sup> An even more subtle form of cooptation is the distribution of selective benefits to buy off elites who could pose a threat to the authoritarian regime (Blaydes & Gillum 2013, Gandhi and Reuter 2013, Howard and Roessler 2006, Levitsky and Way 2010).

can exploit in order to infiltrate their agents into the target organization. In terms of consequences, we argue that infiltration as covert persuasion offers the regime significant advantages in manipulating public opinion because infiltrators may be more effective in their political objectives when ordinary members are unaware of their identity as regime agents. We test these theoretical predictions against competing explanations (including imperial legacies and modernization) using a unique dataset, which combines fine-grained subnational data on authoritarian infiltration of the Catholic Church in communist Poland with individual-level data from seven Polish surveys from the late communist period (1985-89). Our results confirm the importance of organizational vulnerability in driving the success of communist infiltration efforts and suggest that it was effective in undermining the Church's ability to shape the political attitudes of churchgoers.

The next section develops our theory and hypotheses. Section three justifies our empirical context: the Polish communist party's infiltration of the Catholic Church in the 1950s. The fourth section is devoted to data analysis. We compare the effect of church attendance in areas infiltrated with "red" priests to areas not infiltrated by "red" priests to find that infiltration changes (unfavorably) the link between attending church and anti-communist attitudes. The final section discusses our results and draws implications from our findings for authoritarian survival.

## ***2. Theoretical Framework***

We first focus on the drivers of infiltration and next, on the consequences of this strategy.

### ***2.1. Drivers of Infiltration***

The autocrat's decision to infiltrate an organization depends on its mix of penetrability and moral authority. If organizations lack moral authority, they may not be worth infiltrating: instead, the state can either eradicate them without risking backlash or ignore them without significant

consequences for regime stability. Other organizations, such as underground conspiracies, may be attractive infiltration targets but they are often too hard to penetrate because they are difficult to reach or lack a centralized leadership (Schetyna 2019).

The most likely infiltration targets are organizations that maintain moral authority with the public, and can therefore challenge the regime's legitimacy and political dominance, but are easier to penetrate because they operate openly and have a broad membership. The moral authority of such organizations raises the costs of eradication efforts but also ensures that once captured from within, they can be used to influence the "hearts and minds" of citizens of the authoritarian state. Churches are among the most prominent examples of such organizations: they can carry significant moral authority (Grzymala-Busse 2015) and, if they can be effectively controlled by the regime, they may become valuable instruments of authoritarian control.

The key question, then, is under what circumstances are authoritarian regimes able to infiltrate these coveted institutional targets. In the broadest sense, the outcome depends on the balance between the coercive capacity of the regime and the resistance capacity of the target. We focus on the latter component. We show that controlling for regime strength, the success of infiltration efforts depends on the organizational vulnerability of the target organization. In other words, the same regime may be successful in infiltrating some organizations but not others,<sup>6</sup> or, even within a given organization, it may be more successful in infiltrating some parts of it than others.

We argue that these within-regime and within-organization variations in the success of infiltration strategies are a function of the organizational strength/vulnerability at the time when the regime launches its infiltration campaign. These variations in organizational vulnerability are a combination of long-term and short-term factors. Non-state organizations can differ in the

---

<sup>6</sup> Braun (2016) finds that minority churches in the Netherlands were more likely to help Jews during the Holocaust in part because they were harder to penetrate by the Nazi authorities.

long-term trajectory of their relationship to both the state and society in ways that can affect their ability to resist infiltration efforts. For example, according to Janos (2000) the Catholic Church was more resilient to communist control than the Eastern Orthodox Church in part because of a longer history of subordination of Orthodox churches to the state. Beyond such long-term factors, short-term shocks can also weaken organizations. Such shocks can occur at the elite and/or the grassroots level and may be driven by either exogenous crises (such as social and political turmoil) or “self-inflicted wounds” (such as leadership successions or scandals). Regardless of their origin, such short-term shocks to organizational strength leave organizations vulnerable to infiltration by regime agents. Therefore, the first hypothesis we will test is:

**H1 Organizational vulnerability increases the likelihood of successful authoritarian infiltration.**

We next consider how the broader societal context shapes the balance of power between authoritarian regimes and non-state organizations. In particular, we focus on the role of socio-economic modernization. While the link between modernization and regime type has been the subject of extensive – and inconclusive – debates (Przeworski et al 2001, Boix and Stokes 2006), our focus here is how modernization affects authoritarian infiltration efforts. We expect the impact of modernization to vary as a function of the different facets of development. On the one hand, greater economic development should translate into greater access to economic resources, which should make it easier for organizations to resist economic and political pressures by the regime. Similarly, organizations with more educated members should be better at resisting regime infiltration efforts.<sup>7</sup> On the other hand, however, rural communities, because of their

---

<sup>7</sup> Thus, Darden and Grzymala-Busse (2006) show that pre-communist education undermined the ideological effectiveness of communist regimes, while Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2017) document that resistance to communist socialization was greater for citizens from countries with greater pre-communist development.

tight-knit character could be better at resisting infiltration, simply because their members are more familiar with one another, allowing infiltrators to be identified and neutralized more easily than in industrialized urban areas. Hence, modernization, by contributing to the anonymization of social ties, could make non-state organizations susceptible to authoritarian infiltration by making it easier for the regime to recruit secret collaborators from within these organizations. In sum, we consider as an alternative explanation that socio-economic development affects the likelihood of successful authoritarian organizational infiltration, with the caveat that the direction of the effect depends on the specific aspect of development.

## *2.2 Consequences of infiltration*

What are the implications of a successful infiltration campaign? While infiltration is likely to affect a broad range of outcomes, including inter-personal trust, here we focus on an issue that is key for authoritarian incumbents: the extent to which infiltration affects the battle between the regime and the opposition over citizens' "hearts and minds." In particular, to what extent can infiltration undermine the way civil society organizations shape anti-regime attitudes?

Where infiltration has been successful, ordinary members do not know the identity of the regime agents (and will often be even unaware of the existence of infiltrators). In this scenario, which is our main theoretical and empirical focus, the effects of organizational infiltration on trust in the organization and participation should be limited, as the behavior of ordinary members is not affected by the knowledge of having infiltrators in their midst. This leads to our second hypothesis:

### **H2: Infiltration does not affect participation and trust in the organization.**

At the same time, covert regime agents within the organization have ample opportunities to affect the attitudes of its members. Since these agents act incognito, citizens will not discount

their messages as government propaganda. This influence should be particularly pronounced when regime agents occupy locally prominent positions, such as teachers, union leaders or priests. Such positions provide agents with copious occasions – and often significant role-based legitimacy – to influence the views of those around them. This leads to our final hypothesis:

**H3: Infiltration reduces the ability of the affected organization to foster anti-authoritarian resistance.**

In the next section we discuss how these hypotheses can be translated to the Polish context.

### ***3. The Empirical Setting: The Catholic Church in Communist Poland***

Among the actors who compete with autocrats for citizens' hearts and minds, religious organizations represent “the most diverse and robust form of associational life outside of the state” (Koesel 2014, p. 3). In authoritarian regimes, religious organizations, alongside opposition parties and labor unions can undermine authoritarian efforts to dominate public discourse. Middle Eastern (Wickham 2005, Masoud 2014) and Latin American (Trejo 2012) secular autocracies as well as the Philippines (Youngblood 1990, Grzymała-Busse and Slater 2018) are illustrative of these effects. The influence of religion on political participation has also been recently documented in the sub-Saharan context (McClendon and Riedl 2019).

Since in communist regimes, conflict between the authoritarian state and religious communities was prevalent, and non-state organizations were virtually absent, we would expect churches to be even more important in this context (Ramet 1987, Burgess 1997, Weigel 2003, Wittenberg 2006). There are, however, dramatic differences in the extent to which communist incumbents maintain their control over public opinion against challenges from organized religion. Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2017) show that communist exposure affects political attitudes of Catholics considerably less than their Eastern Orthodox counterparts. In the

case of Hungary, Wittenberg (2006) discovers weaker communist legacies in voting behavior of Catholics relative to Protestants. Grzymala-Busse (2015) explains the Catholic Church's influence in Polish politics by the fusion between Catholicism and Polish national identity.

The case of the Catholic Church in Poland offers additional advantages for studying strategies of infiltration, as the organization had clear moral authority to pose a threat to the communist Polish state in the competition for the citizens' "hearts and minds." Yet the universal fusion between Polish nationalism and Catholic religion raised the costs of using brute force against it (Grzymala-Busse 2015). The regime's alternative to curbing the influence of this organization was a far-reaching infiltration campaign of the Catholic Church.<sup>8</sup>

The regime's long-term plan to take control of the Catholic Church organization was to recruit within the clergy about 1,000 communist sympathizers, roughly 10% of all priests residing in Poland (Zurek 2003). The most sustained of these efforts took place in 1949-1956 as the communist government used a two-pronged approach: First, at the parish-level it focused on recruiting freshly minted clerics graduating from theological seminaries. Second, it targeted the elite level of the Catholic hierarchy.<sup>9</sup> On September 1, 1949, the communists created a special "Section for Priests within the Society of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy" (*Sekcja Księży przy ZBoWiD*). Informally, the group was referred to as the "Patriot" or "Progressive" Priests (*Księża Patrioci*). Its leaders were tasked with the mission of building the network of regional cells, called *Priest Councils*. The executive framework of the Patriot Priest organization was set up shortly after 1950, once all regional ZBoWiD branches had their affiliated Priest Councils .

---

<sup>8</sup> This fact facilitates our sub-national analysis by eliminating the large pre-communist differences in ethnic and religious compositions of inter-war Poland.

<sup>9</sup> For space and theoretical reasons, we focus on the first strategy and relegate analysis of the effects of the second to Appendix A (but we find similar patterns for both types of infiltration).

The *Patriot Priests*' Mission Statement asserted that "in terms of beliefs, they are in complete agreement with the Episcopate, but in terms of political and social outlooks, they represent the Polish people." This was an effort to stoke conflict between the left-leaning part of the clergy and the conservative Episcopate. The declaration also highlighted the necessity of reconciliation between the Church and the Polish communist state. The *Patriot Priests* used the organization's bi-weekly periodicals— "The Priest Smithy" (*Kuznica Kaplanska*), "The Citizen Priest" (*Ksiadz Obywatel*), and "The Priest's Voice" (*Glos Kaplana*) to disseminate ideological content.<sup>10</sup> Their subject matter ranged from advice on how to deal with the "tyrant" power of the Vatican and the Episcopate to ideas on reconciling religion with communist ideology:

Today's churches attract members of the working class in large numbers. (...) Illustrative examples should be sampled from contemporary life in a way that is clear and transparent for factory and steel mill workers. Alongside citations from the bible, they must include references to current events: the 6-year plan, the battle for peace and for collectivization, physical labor, respect for collective property and respect for the Party and the fight with the "Colorado bug." (*Kuźnica Kapłańska* 1953).<sup>11</sup>

*Patriot Priests* received "assignments" from three sources: The State Agency for Religious Beliefs, the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) and the Ministry of Public Security (MBP). The MBP coordinated parish visits to vet priests that were desirable recruitment targets, seeking out those known to be in conflict with their bishops, or former concentration camp prisoners and priests who had survived Gestapo arrests (Żurek 2009). The

---

<sup>10</sup> In terms of circulation, we know that for instance, eight thousand copies of "The Priest's Voice" were distributed nationwide (Żurek, 2009, Żaryn 1997).

<sup>11</sup> The "Colorado bug" was a parasite ravaging wheat production in Poland. The Communist propaganda maintained the parasites had been air-dropped by Western Capitalists. For more illustrative excerpts from *Patriot Priests* periodicals, see Appendix H.

regime's secret police believed that such extreme experiences with the Nazi occupation would predispose them to view the communist "liberators" with sympathy and gratitude (Żaryn, 1997).

It was not until three years after the thaw, in 1959, that the Episcopate took advantage of the lifting of restrictions on staffing decisions and tried to dismantle the *Patriot Priest* organization. According to Dudek and Gryz, "since the Patriots lacked protection from the communist authorities, they often succumbed to their bishops' authority" (Dudek and Gryz 2006, 180). Although one way of dealing with Patriots' who had been placed in centrally located parishes was to reassign them to nearby, smaller parishes, Dudek and Gryz point out that a "subset of the Patriots refused to follow their reassignment even after the archbishop threatened them with excommunication" (180). Hence, even two years into the "thaw," in 1961, the Department for Religious Beliefs estimated that priests sympathetic to the communist cause made up about 8% of the clergy in Poland (AAN 1956), which is close to the 10% share of *Patriot Priests* at the height of the infiltration campaign.<sup>12</sup>

While the communist authorities ultimately failed to control the Catholic Church at the national level (Grzymała-Busse 2017), they achieved greater success in some areas than in others both at the elite level of the church leadership and at the level of rank-and-file priests. According to our theoretical discussion (summarized in Hypothesis 1), we expect infiltration to have been more effective where the Church was organizationally weaker.

Poland's tumultuous history offers three sources of sub-national variation in organizational vulnerability along the lines of our theoretical discussion. The first source, which produced a short-term increase in organizational vulnerability in parts of the country, is associated with Poland's territorial westward shift after WWII. In return for ceding former eastern territories to

---

<sup>12</sup> No estimates exist about how these figures changed from 1961 to the 1980s, when our surveys were conducted.

the Soviet Union, Poland was compensated with formerly Prussian territories in the west, which were euphemistically termed the “Recovered Territories” (see Map B3 in Appendix B).

Following the annexation of the Recovered Territories in 1945, the communists carried out a vast resettlement project. Three and a half million Germans, who made up over 90% of the population in the newly acquired territories, were given 48 hours to leave (Curp 2006). Their homes were transferred to mostly Polish and – to a lesser extent – Ukrainian and Lemka migrants, many of them from the eastern territories lost to the Soviet Union (Charnysh 2019).

Krystyna Kersten’s analysis of the communist takeover of Poland captures the far-reaching consequences of this resettlement project: “Traditional structures and patterns of life were destroyed or badly eroded, social ties within the family, among neighbors, and in localities were weakened.” (1991, 165). Unsurprisingly, the extent of migration was uneven across different parts of post-WWII Poland, ranging from less than 10% in most of the East to over 90% in many areas of the Recovered Territories in Western and Northern Poland (see Map B1 in Appendix B).

As a result of these large variations in migration patterns, Catholic parishes varied greatly in how well-rooted their communities were.<sup>13</sup> In communities disrupted by the inflow of migrants, parishioners had less familiarity with each other, which undermined their ability to detect communist infiltrators. Moreover, many parishes in high-migration areas were understaffed, which created more opportunities for communist authorities to assign to them Patriot Priests. Low migration areas enjoyed higher personnel continuity from before WWII. Church organizations also became more vulnerable because of leadership vacuums following the communist regime’s expulsion of the previous German bishops in the Recovered Territories and the Vatican’s refusal to appoint Polish replacements. These vacancies at the top of the

---

<sup>13</sup> Anthropologists call this phenomenon of rootedness “social disarticulation.” (Cernea 1997)

church hierarchy were transformed into “Capitular Vicar” positions (*Vikariusz Apostolarny*) and filled by Patriot Priests, which undermined the legitimacy of the Catholic Church further (Staar 1956).

The third source of organizational vulnerability to infiltration is associated with long-term or “deep” pre-authoritarian institutional legacies. In 1795, Poland was “partitioned” (*Podzaborami*) by the Prussian, Habsburg, and Russian empires for a period extending over 123 years.<sup>14</sup> The borders of the three empires shifted over time and in some instances, gave rise to briefly independent “republics.” Poland regained its independence in 1918 but, as mentioned in our earlier discussion, the Recovered Territories stayed German until 1946. As a result, different parts of contemporary Poland varied significantly in how long they were part of an independent Polish state. The subnational variation in independent statehood should translate into variation in organizational vulnerability. We expect the Church to be more resilient in areas that made up an independent Polish state longer.

Of course, in the Polish case the role of historical legacies is likely to extend to a broader set of channels beyond the length of independence. A sizeable literature (Rykiel 2011, Bartkowski 2003, Zarycki 2007, 2000, 2008, Janicki and Władysław 2005, Sleszyński 2007, Davies 2005, Wolff 2010, Jasiewicz 2009) has documented the continued political relevance of imperial legacies in post-communist Poland. For the purpose of our analysis, an important difference between the three empires was their different approach to language and religious rights. While Catholic Habsburgs permitted extensive religious freedoms and tolerated greater cultural autonomy, the Russians promoted Russification and restricted the use of Polish language

---

<sup>14</sup> The partition borders within a contemporary map of Poland appear in Map B3 in Appendix B.

(particularly in religious practice), while the Prussians persecuted the use of Polish language but less assertively for purposes of practicing religion.

While these differential imperial policies could have long-term implications for the institutional resilience of the Catholic Church, it is important to remember that imperial legacies are multi-faceted and also include many aspects that are not directly relevant to resilience of non-state organizations. One such factor, which could represent an alternative explanation for infiltration in the Polish context, builds on the work of Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya (2015) who point out that industrialization differences may account for the different political dynamics often attributed to imperial legacies. Relatedly, differences in imperial policies could drive sub-national variations in education and urbanization, which could in turn affect infiltration potential in opposite ways, as discussed in section 2. In light of these considerations, imperial legacies are important control variables to include in our regressions.

Finally, turning to the consequences of infiltration, applying Hypothesis 3 to the Polish context suggests that the church should be less effective as a site of anti-regime resistance in more heavily infiltrated areas. Of course, even though Poland is an overwhelmingly Catholic country,<sup>15</sup> the effects of infiltration must be moderated by respondents' actual church attendance. *Church Attendance* offers a mechanism through which infiltration can affect attitudes over such a long stretch of time. Hoffman and Nugent (2015) for instance, explore how religion affects political preferences and behavior through attending communal worship in Lebanon. The authors find significant effects of attendance in religious worship with opposite effects for Christians and for Muslims. In the case of Poland, all or almost all respondents are Catholic, so we would not expect different effects of service attendance within the same region, as Nugent and Hoffman do.

---

<sup>15</sup> Or at least was in the 1980s.

Moreover, their dependent variable is support for militant political parties in Lebanon. This is another important difference between their research and ours, as Poland's opposition was non-violent. We expect, thus, to observe weaker anti-communist attitudinal effects of church attendance in areas with higher shares of *Patriot Priests*. At the same time, however, according to Hypothesis 2, given the covert nature of infiltration, we do not expect to see a strong link between Patriot Priest shares and church attendance and trust

#### **4. Data and methods**

One of the key obstacles to studying the effects of authoritarian infiltration – and political attitudes in authoritarian regimes more broadly – is the scarcity of credible public opinion surveys in most autocracies. The Polish case offers significant advantages in this respect: thanks to seven surveys carried out in 1985-1989 by the Center for Public Opinion Research (CBOS), we are able to analyze citizen attitudes towards the authoritarian regime and the opposition before the collapse of the communist regime in mid-1989.


CBOS was created following the rise and fall of the dissident trade union Solidarity, when the authorities realized that relying on reports from the secret police alone left them unprepared for outbreaks of popular dissidence. This motivation for the surveys, combined with Poland's greater tolerance for dissenting views and its long tradition of sociological surveys, makes these data less vulnerable to the biases and distortions that can plague surveys conducted in authoritarian settings.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, since our analysis focuses on sub-national variation in the effects of church attendance, our findings would only be biased if preference falsification affected churchgoers and non-churchgoers differentially in different regions.<sup>17</sup> To test our

---

<sup>16</sup> See Appendix F for a discussion of how we deal with potential bias in these surveys.

<sup>17</sup> As we show in Table F1 in Appendix F, that is not the case.

theoretical predictions, we combine the individual-level survey data with aggregate-level historical data from Poland’s subnational administrative districts.



**Figure 1:** Map reflecting the density of *Patriot Priests* in post-WWII Poland by województwa according to materials collected by Zurek (2003). Note, the map uses administrative divisions from 1975, but using census data and GIS coding we fit it to match the 49 województwa (administrative units in Poland) contemporary with our survey data).

(województwo). For our key variable of interest – the extent of communist infiltration of the Catholic Church – we use a combination of historical sources. To measure organizational infiltration, we used a collection of Special Reports produced by Radio Free Europe between 1949 and 1956, which allowed historians to document, at the aggregate level, the activities of the *Patriot Priests* (Żurek 2003, 2009). Based on these historical accounts, we calculated the *Patriot Priest Share* in each of the 49 Polish województwa. When mapping these infiltration patterns in Figure 1 above, we find significant subnational variation that suggests that the parishes in the Recovered Territories were indeed more heavily infiltrated than those in the rest of Poland.

Turning to the independent variables, the most difficult challenge was measuring organizational vulnerability. Building on our theoretical discussion, we created three different proxies for such weakness. The first proxy captures organizational weakness at the elite level; it is a dichotomous indicator of whether or not a województwo belonged to a diocese that lacked a titular bishop as a result of the communist regime's expulsion of the previous German bishops and the refusal of the Vatican to appoint new Polish replacements. The second proxy, also based on the upheaval following the postwar border changes, focuses on the effects of large-scale migration. Specifically, we argue that migrant shares (also measured at the województwo-level and illustrated in Map B1 in Appendix B) capture the extent to which the Catholic Church was weakened at the parish level creating opportunities for *Patriot Priests* to be appointed to openings in new parishes without churchgoers noticing. The third proxy captures the idea that the societal embeddedness and, hence, the institutional strength of the Catholic Church would be greater in areas that had been part of an independent Polish state for a longer time period. Therefore, we calculated for each województwo the number of years that it had been incorporated into an independent Polish state between 1795 (the year of the third and final Partition) and 1939.

While these three proxies capture slightly different aspects of organizational strength, in practice the three indicators were very highly correlated. Therefore, rather than relying on any one of these indicators, or including three highly correlated variables in the same model (and, therefore, getting unstable results due to multi-collinearity), we used an *Organizational vulnerability index* based on the three measures in our main analysis.<sup>18</sup>

---

<sup>18</sup> The index, which is a standardized average of the three indicators, had a Cronbach's alpha statistic of .95. In Appendix F, we show that our results are robust to using any of the three proxies separately. When combining multiple organizational vulnerability proxies in the same model specification, we only find significant effects for migrant shares (see table E1) but in a regression with standardized variables, we

To measure subnational developmental differences, we collected województwo-level data from the 1950 census on three proxies of socioeconomic development: the value of industrial production per capita, the proportion of people living in urban settlements over 10,000 inhabitants, and the number of school classrooms per capita (as a proxy of education).

Finally, to capture any residual effects of imperial legacies beyond the length of independence and the modernization outcomes discussed above, we assigned the administrative units to three regions defined by the historical boundaries of the Russian, Prussian and Habsburg empires illustrated in Map A3 in Appendix B.<sup>19</sup>

As an additional robustness check, discussed in Appendix G, we consider the possibility that the decisions of where to direct infiltration efforts were demand driven. According to this logic, regime demand for infiltration would lead us to expect greater infiltration in border areas, especially in areas with newly established borders. In Appendix G we test whether the Polish government targeted its infiltration efforts to geopolitically more sensitive border regions by controlling for three different versions of a border indicator - “German border”, “New land border”, “Any border” – and show that none of these variables are significant predictors of infiltration, while the organization weakness index continues to be significant.

For our analysis of the consequences of infiltration, we use the aforementioned nationally representative public opinion surveys conducted between June 1985 (less than two years after Martial Law was lifted) and January 1989 (immediately prior to the Roundtable talks that paved the way for free elections and marked the beginning of the end of communism in the region).

---

find strongest effects of years of independence. Because these models suffer from high multicollinearity we interpret these results with caution.

<sup>19</sup> Note that the territories coded as Russian in Map B1 in Appendix B had initially belonged to the Prussian and Habsburg empires after 1792 but were incorporated into the Russian empire after 1815 and 1848. The original Russian partition is not part of post-WWII Poland.

Therefore, even though conducted over the period of less than four years, the surveys span a period ranging from staunch authoritarian repression to relative liberalization. Our results are not affected by preference falsification. We demonstrate this in Appendix F, which offers an exhaustive justification for the use of these surveys. To ensure that the surveys are nationally representative, we contrasted the sample to census data and where appropriate, applied weights to certain groups of respondents (details on the construction of these weights are in Appendix F).

In line with our theoretical discussion, we focus on three possible effects of infiltration. To test Hypothesis 2, predicting that infiltration does not affect participation and trust in the organization, we use *religious attendance* (using a three-category survey question, where 0=never, 1=irregular, 2=regular) to measure participation in the organization and measure trust with answers to the question “Does the Catholic Church serve the interests of society?” This question is measured on a five-point scale. Finally, to gauge the ability of the Church to transmit anti-regime attitudes we used a question about support for the PZPR, the ruling party in communist Poland and a question asking about attitudes to the anti-communist opposition.<sup>20</sup> From these two questions (both of which were asked on a five-point scale) we created the dependent variable for our analysis, *Net Communist Support*, which we calculated as the difference between the expressed support for the PZPR and the support for the opposition and then normalized so that it ranges from 0 (complete opposition support) to 1 (complete regime

---

<sup>20</sup> In Communist Poland, the Polish United Workers’ Party was, according to the Constitution, the leading political power and only state sanctioned satellite parties were allowed to officially register and compete in elections. These satellite parties (ZSL and SD) were not considered the opposition. Since other parties were banned, the space for contesting the regime was filled by sympathizers and former members of the Solidarity Trade Union, which had also been banned since Martial Law (December 1981), but was nevertheless a widely recognized brand. Therefore, when the survey questionnaire inquired about “the opposition” Solidarity was the association respondents would have with that term. Even in official propaganda, the terms opposition, Solidarity opposition and anticommunist opposition were used interchangeably.

support). This variable has an almost exactly neutral mean (.53) and a standard deviation of .24 for the surveys analyzed in this article.

Since we are interested in how infiltration weakens the Catholic Church's ability to shape anti-regime attitudes, our main focus in the second part of the analysis is on the effects of church attendance (and how they are moderated by infiltration.) We measure *religious attendance* based on a three-category survey question (0=never, 1=irregular, 2=regular).

The surveys also included questions for a host of demographic variables, such as gender, age, education (primary/vocational, secondary and higher education), a detailed set of occupational categories and locality size, which we used as controls in the regressions.

Critically, the surveys identify respondents up to the level of województwo. Based on this geographic identifier we were able to complement the individual-level survey data with the województwo-level variables described above. However, given the timing of the surveys, rather than using the developmental indicators from the 1950 census (as in the infiltration drivers' tests discussed above) we used data from the 1985-1989 Polish Statistical Yearbooks to calculate the share of production in different economic sectors (heavy industry, light industry and agriculture). In addition, we used contemporary województwo-level macro-economic indicators of capital investments and fixed assets as control variables to capture the effects of economic conditions. Given the multi-level structure of our data (individual, województwo-survey, and województwo), we use hierarchical linear models with random intercepts for our analysis of the attitudinal consequences of infiltration.

## **5. Results**


Figure 2, which is based on the regressions in Table A2 in Appendix E, presents the main findings about the drivers of communist infiltration of the Catholic Church. To ensure

comparability across different types of indicators, we present the predicted values of Patriot Priest infiltration (at the district-level) along with 95% confidence intervals for low (10<sup>th</sup> percentile) and high (90<sup>th</sup> percentile) values of the key variables of interest while holding other variables constant (at the sample mean.)

The results in Figure 2 provide strong support for the organizational vulnerability hypothesis (Hypothesis 1): the communist regime was significantly more likely to infiltrate the Catholic Church in parts of Poland where the church was organizationally weaker in the late 1940s, just prior to the launch of the *Patriot Priests* campaign. These results were not only statistically significant but substantively quite large: the predicted difference in Patriot Priest shares between low and high vulnerability districts was equivalent to roughly two standard deviations in the dependent variable.<sup>21</sup> In Low Vulnerability areas, the average infiltration was barely 6%, while in high vulnerability areas it was as high as 17%.

---

<sup>21</sup> In Appendix A, in Table A1, we show similar (but substantively smaller) patterns for elite-level infiltration. In Appendix F, in Table F2, we also decompose our organizational vulnerability index to standardized versions of its components—migration shares, leadership vacuum and legacies of independence. We show that individually, each acts as a powerful predictor of infiltration, with standardized “years of independence” having a higher coefficient than “migrant shares” and “leadership vacuum.” At the same time, we Table A5 still shows that when all three measures are included simultaneously, only migration shares survives as significant. However, we attribute this to high multicollinearity between index components.




By comparison, support for alternative explanations of organizational infiltration – imperial legacies and socio-economic development – was noticeably weaker. While Figure 2 reveals some tentative evidence that infiltration was weaker in the areas of the former Habsburg Empire, these differences were substantively small and at best marginally significant.

The three sets of estimates in the lower part of Figure 2 reveal mixed support for the effects of socioeconomic development. Thus, there is no evidence that industrial development is associated with different degrees of infiltration. As expected, infiltration was lower in less urbanized settings, but the effects were only marginally significant (at .1) and not particularly large. Finally, areas with weaker educational infrastructure were somewhat more likely to experience infiltration but the effects were only marginally significant (at .1) and substantively fairly modest. In sum, the effect of modernization as a general phenomenon, is ambiguous.

Having established that organizational vulnerability is a key driver of institutional infiltration, we now turn to testing the attitudinal and behavioral consequences of infiltration. To do so, we first test how variations in the county-level shares of Patriot Priests affect church attendance (as a proxy of organizational engagement). Next, we test whether and how infiltration

moderates the effects of church attendance on trust towards the Church (testing hypothesis 2) and on net support for the communist regime (testing hypothesis 3). The full regressions on the basis of which these figures were created are reported in Table D3 in Appendix D. It is worth highlighting that in it, we control for all the components of organizational vulnerability. For ease of interpretation, we rescaled all the dependent variables in Figure 3 to a 0-1 scale.



Overall, the patterns in the right panel of Figure 3, which show the effects of church attendance on *Net Communist Support*, reveal clear evidence that infiltration undermined the ability of the Catholic Church to promote anti-regime attitudes among its followers. Thus, we find that in low-infiltration areas (corresponding to the 10<sup>th</sup> percentile in Patriot Priests shares), church attendance was associated with significantly more anti-regime political attitudes. Meanwhile, in areas that the communist regime had successfully infiltrated in the early 1950s, the anti-regime effects of church attendance were over 50% smaller and fell short of achieving statistical significance.

At the same time however, in line with Hypothesis 2, the left panel in Figure 3 shows no systematic difference in church attendance as a function of Patriot Priest shares: in other words, we find no evidence that infiltration undermined participation by rank-and-file members in the infiltrated organization. Similarly, the middle panel in Figure 3 suggests that the effects of church attendance on trust towards the Catholic Church was not affected by the extent of Patriot Priest infiltration. These patterns are consistent with our claims in Section 3 that communist regime's infiltration was largely a covert operation, i.e., most churchgoers were unaware of the identity of regime infiltrators in their midst. As a result, it appears that the *institution* of the Catholic Church as an organization was not weakened by infiltration (we do not observe a reduction in membership or trust) but its political effectiveness in challenging the communist regime suffered significantly.

It is important to note that the attitudinal imprint of communist infiltration we document in these surveys from 1985-89 remained visible more than three decades after the heyday of the Patriot Priest campaign. While such long-term persistence is in line with the patterns observed in previous studies of communist attitudinal legacies (Lupu and Peisakhin 2015, Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017), it nevertheless raises important questions of how to interpret these results. We see two possible interpretations of the patterns in Figure 3, which have different observable implications. On the one hand, they could be due to the long-term persistence of a powerful but temporary "treatment" in the form of the Patriot Priests' campaign of the mid-1950s. In this case the effects should be largely confined to respondents who attended church during the heyday of the Patriot Priest period (1950-56) If, on the other hand, the presence of covert regime sympathizers continued to shape the Catholic Church after 1956, then we should see similar attitudinal differences even among respondents who started attending church later. This latter

possibility assumes that during the “thaw”, the Episcopate was unsuccessful in purging parishes of Patriot Priests and even though they lacked a steering organization, these priests occupied a position that could go to a pro-opposition sympathizer.

To adjudicate between these two explanations, we used a respondent’s year of birth to calculate the length of early and adult exposure of survey respondents to the Catholic Church during the heyday of the Patriot Priest campaign (1950-56).<sup>22</sup> Using this approach, in Figure 4 we illustrate the variation in the anti-communist effects of church attendance as a function of the degree of church infiltration and the length of early vs. adult church exposure in 1950-56.<sup>23</sup>

The results in Figure 4 confirm the lasting effects of a short-lived infiltration: for respondents who were old enough to have gone to Church during the Patriot Priest heyday (1950-56), church attendance had a significant anti-communist effect only in areas with relatively low levels of Patriot Priest infiltration, while in high-infiltration areas the effects were substantively small and statistically insignificant. Furthermore, the differences between low and high infiltration areas were significant for all respondents with direct exposure, though the difference appears to have been substantively larger for those exposed during the impressionable years (aged 6-17) than for adults.<sup>24</sup>

By contrast, the two estimates at the bottom of Figure 4 reveal that for respondents who were too young to have attended Church during the crucial infiltration period (1950-56), subsequent church attendance produced substantively similar and statistically indistinguishable

---


<sup>22</sup> Following Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2017) we defined early exposure as occurring between the ages of 6-17 (a cutoff which coincides with the timing for first communion) and adult exposure as eighteen and older.

<sup>23</sup> The results are based on triple interactions between infiltration, church attendance and the length of early and late exposure to the Catholic Church during 1950-56. See Table A3 in Appendix E for full regression results.

<sup>24</sup> We call these years “impressionable” because during this period Catholics accept and undergo training towards two initiation events: “First Communion” at age 7-8 and “Confirmation” (at age 13-15).

negative effects. In other words, once the Patriot Priests organization stopped functioning in a concerted fashion, church attendance had very similar – and significantly anti-communist – attitudinal consequence in both high- and low-infiltration areas.

This suggests that while *Patriot Priests* had a strong and lasting impact on political attitudes during the time when they were most active, their influence seems to have declined substantially in subsequent years. As explained above, this could be the result of a successful purge from positions of influence by the Episcopate of the Patriot Priests or because the priests themselves lost motivation to preach pro-regime propaganda once their organization dissolved.



**6. Conclusion**

The results presented in Figures 3 and 4 lead us to conclude that communist efforts to infiltrate the Catholic Church in Poland in the early post-WWII period were at least partially successful in blunting the church’s anti-communist message. However, despite its short-term

effectiveness in shaping political attitudes, and the long-term persistence of these attitudinal effects among directly affected individuals, the scaling back of the Patriot Priest organization led to its failure in controlling the Catholic Church. While this decision may have bought it a temporary truce in the context of the political turmoil of the late 1950s, it ultimately paved the way for the fall of communism three decades later, where the Church acted as a powerful and credible ally of the anti-communist opposition.

Our study offers a unique opportunity to examine the circumstances under which authoritarian regimes use infiltration as a tool of covert persuasion, as well as the long-term effectiveness of such efforts. First, we show that in order for large-scale infiltration strategies to be effective, they must target organizations at vulnerable moments. In the case of the Polish Catholic Church, this vulnerability was driven by a combination of a large-scale population displacement, a leadership vacuum, and shorter legacy of national independence, all captured in our index of organizational vulnerability. We show that such vulnerability matters more than socioeconomic differences and other historical legacies when it comes to successful infiltration efforts.

We also document that infiltration can have far-reaching political effects. Even though the covert nature of infiltration does not allow it to affect the trust and participation in the affected organization, its influence is, in a sense, more insidious. As in the case of propaganda (Rozenas and Stukal 2019), those who have succumbed to its influence, are unaware that they have been affected.

Finally, we turn to the scope conditions of our findings. While efforts to infiltrate non-state organizations are an important element in the authoritarian toolkit, the specific features of our case beg the question of the generalizability of our findings. In terms of the drivers of infiltration

success, we expect our primary finding – that it is easier to infiltrate institutionally vulnerable organizations – to hold across a much broader set of cases beyond post-WWII Poland. Although the particular factors driving organizational vulnerability will of course vary from case to case, we expect two of the drivers identified in this article – societal disarticulation associated with massive population movements and a leadership vacuum – to be key ingredients in many instances of organizational vulnerability. This suggests that successful authoritarian infiltration efforts should follow highly disruptive events, such as wars, revolutions and pandemics. The post-WWII upheavals in Poland were on the high end of the spectrum of societal disruption. At the same time, the last century provides numerous cases of large-scale social dislocation following authoritarian takeovers, wars of independence, revolutions or civil wars all over the world.

With respect to the attitudinal impact of successful authoritarian infiltration efforts, we would expect our findings – that infiltration undermines the anti-authoritarian impact of participation in the organization but does not decrease trust or participation in the organization – to apply in cases where infiltration was covert, i.e., the identity of regime agents remained largely unknown to regular members of the organization. Where former infiltrators can be identified by regular members, we would expect weaker infiltration effects on anti-regime attitudes (since members would discount the political messages of known regime agents). Conversely, however, widespread awareness of infiltration may lead to decreased trust and participation, unless the targeted organization can effectively identify and eliminate regime infiltrators.

This informs analyses of authoritarian infiltration efforts, as researchers must account for the degree to which regular members knew the identity and frequency of pro-regime infiltrators.

Infiltration levels and transparency of infiltration efforts will obviously vary as a function of the nature of the regime (communist regimes arguably invested more in secret police apparatuses than other regimes), and the nature of the targeted organization (some may be better able to identify and neutralize regime agents.) In light of these considerations, we would expect our findings to apply most clearly to communist and other “high-capacity” authoritarian regimes .

### ***Bibliography***

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. "The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation." *American Economic Review* 91.5 (2001): 1369-1401.

Bartkowski, Jerzy. *Tradycja I Polityka: Wpływ Tradycji Kulturowych Polskich Regionów Na Współczesne Zachowania Społeczne I Polityczne*. Żak, 2003.

Balcells, Laia. *Rivalry and Revenge: The Politics of Violence During Civil War*. Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Bautista, María Angelica, Felipe González, Luis R. Martínez, Pablo Munoz, and Mounu Prem. "The Geography of Repression and Support for Democracy: Evidence from the Pinochet Dictatorship." Available at SSRN 3249606 (2018)

Blaydes, Lisa, and R M. Gillum. "Religiosity-of-interviewer effects: Assessing the impact of veiled enumerators on survey response in Egypt." *Politics and Religion* 6.3 (2013): 459-482.

Blaydes, Lisa. *State of Repression: Iraq Under Saddam Hussein*. Princeton University Press, 2018.

Braun, Robert. "Religious minorities and resistance to genocide: the collective rescue of Jews in the Netherlands during the Holocaust." *American Political Science Review* 110.1 (2016): 127-47.

Burgess, J. P. *The East German church and the end of communism*. Oxford University Pr., 1997.

Cernea, Michael. "The risks and reconstruction model for resettling displaced populations." *World Development* 25.10 (1997): 1569-1587.

Charnysh, Volha. "Diversity, Institutions, and Economic Outcomes: Post-WWII Displacement in Poland." *American Political Science Review* 113.2 (2019): 423-441.

Chen Weiss, Jessica. "China and the future of world politics." *Perspectives on Politics* 15.2 (2017): 486- 94.

Curp, T. David. *A Clean Sweep?: The Politics of Ethnic Cleansing in Western Poland, 1945-1960*. Vol. 7. University Rochester Press, 2006.

Davies, Norman. *God's Playground—a History of Poland in Two Volumes, Volume II; 1795 to the Present (Revised Edition)*. Great Britain: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Dudek, Antoni, and Ryszard Gryz. *Komuniści i Kościół w Polsce: 1945-1989*. Znak, 2003.

Enikolopov, Ruben, Maria Petrova, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. "Media and political persuasion: Evidence from Russia." *American Economic Review* 101.7 (2011): 3253-85.

Gandhi, Jennifer. *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. Cambridge University Press Cambridge, 2008.

Gandhi, Jennifer and Ora John Reuter. "The Incentives for Pre-electoral Coalitions in Non-Democratic Elections" *Democratization* 20, no. 1 (2013): 137-159.

Geddes, Barbara, Erica Frantz, and Joseph G. Wright. "Military rule." *Annual Review of Political Science* 17 (2014): 147-162.

Greitens Chestnut, Sheena. *Dictators and Their Secret Police. Coercive Institutions and State Violence* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Grosfeld, Irena, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. "Cultural vs. economic legacies of empires: Evidence from the partition of Poland." *Journal of Comparative Economics* 43 (2015): 55-75.

Grzymała-Busse, Anna. *Nations under God: How churches use moral authority to influence policy*. Princeton University Press, 2015.

Grzymała-Busse, Anna, and Dan Slater. "Making Godly Nations: Church-State Pathways in Poland and the Philippines." *Comparative Politics* 50.4 (2018): 545-564.

Hoffman, Michael T., and Elizabeth R. Nugent. "Communal religious practice and support for armed parties: Evidence from Lebanon." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61.4 (2017): 869-902.

Howard, Marc Morjé, and Philip G. Roessler. "Liberalizing electoral outcomes in competitive authoritarian regimes." *American Journal of Political Science* 50, No. 2 (2006): 365-381.

Janicki, Mariusz and Wieslaw Wladyka. "Wybory jak Rozbiory," *Polityka* 44 (2005): 4-14.

Jasiewicz, Krzysztof. "'The Past Is Never Dead' Identity, Class, and Voting Behavior in Contemporary Poland." *East European Politics & Societies* 23, No. 4 (2009): 491–508.

Kersten, Krystyna. *The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943-1948*. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1991.

Koesel, Karrie J. *Religion and Authoritarianism: Cooperation, Conflict, and the Consequences*. Cambridge University Press, 2014.

Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. *Competitive authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes after the cold war*. Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Little, Andrew T. "Propaganda and credulity." *Games and Economic Behavior* 102 (2017): 224-32.

Lupu, Noam, & Peisakhin, Leonid. (2017). "The legacy of Political Violence across Generations." *American Journal of Political Science*. doi:10.1111/ajps.12327

Mahoney, James. *Colonialism and postcolonial development: Spanish America in comparative perspective*. Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Magaloni, Beatriz. *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico*. Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Masoud, Tarek. *Counting Islam: religion, class, and elections in Egypt*. Cambridge University Press, 2014.

Mattingly, Daniel C. "Responsive or repressive? How frontline bureaucrats enforce the One Child Policy in China." *Comparative Politics* (2020).

McClendon, Gwyneth H., and Rachel Beatty Riedl. *From Pews to Politics: Religious Sermons and Political Participation in Africa*. Cambridge University Press, 2019.

Nugent, Elizabeth, "The Psychology of Repression and Polarization" (2020). *World Politics*, Forthcoming .

Peisakhin, Leonid "Long Run Persistence of Political Attitudes and Behavior: A Focus on Mechanisms" Paper presented at the *American Political Science Association Meetings* in Washington DC, September 2, 2014, Available at <https://goo.gl/QZ4rSA>

Peisakhin, Leonid, and Arturas Rozenas. "Electoral effects of biased media: Russian television in Ukraine." *American journal of political science* 62.3 (2018): 535-550.

Pop-Eleches, Grigore, and Joshua A. Tucker. *Communism's Shadow: The Effect of Communist Legacies on Post-Communist Political Attitudes*. Princeton University Press, 2017.

Ramet, Sabrina P. *Cross and commissar: the politics of religion in Eastern Europe and the USSR*. Indiana University Press, 1987.

Rozenas, Arturas, Sebastian Schutte, and Yuri Zhukov. "The political legacy of violence: The long-term impact of Stalin's repression in Ukraine." *The Journal of Politics* 79.4 (2017): 1147-1161.

Rozenas, Arturas, and Denis Stukal. "How autocrats manipulate economic news: Evidence from Russia's state-controlled television." *The Journal of Politics* 81.3 (2019): 982-996.

Rykiel, Zbigniew. "Polish Electoral Geography and Its Methods." *Przestrzeń Społeczna* 1, No 1 (2011): 1- 32.

Scharpf, Adam, and Christian Gläsel. "Why underachievers dominate secret police organizations: Evidence from autocratic Argentina." *American Journal of Political Science* (2019, *FirstView*).

Schetyna, Grzegorz. *Historia Pokolenia w Rozmowie z Cezarym Michalskim*. Warszawa: Poltext (2019).

Sleszynski, Przemyslaw. "Dlaczego Lech Kaczyński Wygrał Wybory Prezydenckie 2005. Studium Z Geografii Elektoralnej." ["Why did Lech Kaczyński win the Presidential Election of 2005. A study in Electoral Geography."] *Czasopismo Geograficzne* 78, no. 1–2 (2007): 61–82.

Sulek, Antoni. Systemic transformation and the reliability of survey research: Evidence from Poland. *Polish Sociological Review*, No. 2 (1994):85-100.

Svolik, Milan W. "Contracting on violence: The moral hazard in authoritarian repression and military intervention in politics." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57.5 (2013): 765-794.

- Trejo, Guillermo. *Popular Movements in Autocracies: Religion, Repression, and Indigenous Collective Action in Mexico*. Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Wedeen, Lisa. *Ambiguities of domination: Politics, rhetoric, and symbols in contemporary Syria*. University of Chicago Press, 2015.
- Weigel, George. *The final revolution: the resistance church and the collapse of communism*. Oxford University Press, 2003.
- Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky. *Mobilizing Islam: Religion, activism and political change in Egypt*. Columbia University Press, 2005.
- Wittenberg, Jason. *Crucibles of Political Loyalty: Church Institutions and Electoral Continuity in Hungary*. Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Wolff, Larry. *The Idea of Galicia: History and Fantasy in Habsburg Political Culture*. Stanford University Press, 2010
- Youngblood, Robert L. *Marcos Against the Church: Economic Development and Political Repression in the Phillipines*. Cornell University Press, 1990.
- Żarycki, Tomasz. "Politics in the Periphery: Political Cleavages in Poland Interpreted in Their Historical and International Context." *Europe-Asia Studies* 52, no. 5 (2000): 851–73.
- Żarycki, Tomasz. "Polska i jej regiony a debata postkolonialna." *Oblicze polityczne regionów Polski*, Białystok: Wyższa Szkoła Finansów i Zarządzania (2008): 31-48.
- Żarycki, Tomasz. "History and Regional Development. A Controversy over the 'right interpretation of the Role of History in the Development of the Polish Regions.'" *Geoforum* 38, No. 3 (2007): 485–93.

Żaryn, Jan. *Kościół a władza w Polsce (1945-1950)* [“*The Church and Government in Poland (1945-1950)*”], Warszawa, DiG 1997

Żurek, Jacek. *Kim Byli „księża–patrioci?”* [“Who were the *Patriot Priests?*”]. *Biuletyn IPN* 3, no. 1 (24) (2003).

Żurek, Jacek. *Ruch “Księży Patriotów” W Województwie Katowickim W Latach 1949-1956*. [“*The Patriot Priests the the Katowickie Wojewodztwo in 1949-1956*”]. Warsaw: IPN, 2009.